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When Clients Do
Bad Things
The Lawyer's Response to Corporate Wrongdoing
By C. Craig Bradley, Jr.
The high profile meltdowns
of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Adelphia, Global Crossing and
other well-known companies
have focused attention on the
responsibilities of corporate
gatekeepers, including attor-
neys, to deter or expose fraudu-
lent conduct by their clients and
associated persons. Attorneys
have been the subject of investi-
gation and criticism by Con-
gress' and federal regulators2 for
failing to adequately respond to
their clients 'fraudulent (and,
possibly, criminal) conduct. The
lawyer who learns that his or
her client or persons acting on
its behalf are engaged in a
course offraudulent or criminal
conduct which threatens eco-
nomic losses to non-client third
parties faces both an ethical and
a moral dilemma. On the one
hand, the lawyer owes a profes-
sional duty to his or her client
to protect the confidentiality of
information communicated to
the lawyer during the represen-
tation. At the same time, what
responsibility does the lawyer
have to investors and others who
may suffer significant financial
losses as a result of the client's
undisclosed fraud?
This article summarizes the rel-
evant rules of professional conduct
which guide a business lawyer's re-
sponse to evidence of corporate
wrongdoing and discusses recent re-
form initiatives by the federal govern-
ment and the organized bar to im-
prove systems of corporate responsi-
bility and accountability. It concludes
with a discussion of a recent ruling in
the securities fraud case brought by
investors against Enron's outside
counsel and the company's other pro-
fessional and financial advisers for
their participation in structuring and
concealing Enron's allegedly fraudu-
lent financing transactions.
Rules of Professional Conduct
The principal ethics rules govern-
ing a lawyer's response to suspected
fraud by an organizational client are
Model Rules 1.2 (Scope of Represen-
tation), 1.6 (Confidentiality of Infor-
mation), 1.13 (Organization as Client),
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Rep-
resentation) and 4.1 (Truthfulness in
Statements to Others). Each of these
rules is discussed below.
The Entity as Client
Model Rule 1.13 contains the ba-
sic core principle that the entity, and
not its various constituencies, is the
client. The rule states that a lawyer
employed or retained by an organiza-
tion represents the entity (that is, the
organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents). The law-
yer's duty is to serve the interests of
the organization and not the personal
interests of its officers, directors, em-
ployees and shareholders.' Although
the lawyer for the organization takes
direction from its officers, directors
and employees acting within the
scope of their authority on behalf of
the organization, the lawyer owes his
or her professional duties only to the
organization.
Rule 1.13 guides the corporate
lawyer who learns of possible mis-
conduct by an officer or employee of
his or her client. The rule provides
that the lawyer shall proceed "as is
reasonably necessary in the best in-
terest of the organization" if the law-
yer knows that an officer, employee
or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action re-
lated to the representation that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the
organization or a violation of law
which is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization. Rule
1.13(b) provides a range of options
that the lawyer may (but is not re-
quired to) pursue to prevent harm to
the organization. The lawyer may
ask for reconsideration of the matter,
recommend that a separate legal
opinion be sought on the matter, or
refer the matter to a higher authority
within the organization. If the lawyer
has exhausted his or her remedial
options under Rule 1.13(b) and the
highest authority within the organiza-
tion "insists upon action, or a refusal
to act, that is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer
may resign in accordance with Rule
1.16." Only misconduct that is re-
lated to the representation triggers the
lawyer's duties under Rule 1.13.
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The requirements of Rule 1.13
apply only if the lawyer "knows" of
the actual or intended misconduct on
the part of an officer, employee or
agent of the corporation. Under the
model rules, a lawyer "knows" a par-
ticular fact if he or she
has actual knowledge of
its existence. This falls
short of the "reasonably
should know" standard
found elsewhere in the
rules.
Scope of Representation
Rule 1.2 states that a
lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision concern-
ing the objectives of rep-
resentation. However,
the lawyer must not,
within the requested
scope of representation,
counsel a client to en-
gage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or
fraudulent. Comment [6]
to Model Rule 1.2 ad-
dresses the distinction
Confidentiality
of Client Information
Rule 1.6 generally prohibits the
disclosure of information relating to
the representation of a client unless
Kentucky is among
a small minority of
states that do not
permit disclosure to
third parties to
prevent financial or
economic harm to
others. Over forty
states currently per-
mit or require some
form of disclosure
to third parties to
prevent a client
from committing a
criminal fraud.
between permissible advice and legal
analysis and improper assistance by
the lawyer in the conduct of a client's
crime or fraud. It states in part:
The fact that a client uses ad-
vice in a course of action that
is criminal or fraudulent does
not, of itself, make a lawyer a
party to the course of action.
However, a lawyer may not
knowingly assist a client in
criminal or fraudulent conduct.
There is a critical distinction
between presenting an analysis
of legal aspects of questionable
conduct and recommending the
means by which a crime or
fraud might be committed with
impunity.
the client gives an
informed consent.
Paragraph (b) of
Model Rule 1.6
and the corre-
sponding Ken-
tucky ethics rule
identify certain
narrow exceptions
to the general rule
of non-disclosure.
The lawyer may
(but is not required
to) reveal informa-
tion relating to the
representation if
reasonably neces-
sary to prevent
reasonably certain
death4 or substan-
tial bodily harm or
to establish a claim
or defenses in a
dispute between
the lawyer and the
client or in a civil action or disciplin-
ary proceeding against the lawyer
involving the representation. Addi-
tionally, disclosure of client informa-
tion is permitted to comply with other
law or a court order. It is not clear
from a reading of the rules or the
comments what is meant by "other
law" or the circumstances under
which disclosure would be allowed in
those instances. Comment [21] to
Kentucky Rule 1.6 notes that "a law-
yer may be obligated or permitted by
other provisions of law to give infor-
mation about a client. Whether an-
other provision of law supersedes
Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation
beyond the scope of these Rules, but
a presumption should exist against
such a supersession." This exception
for laws outside the scope of the pro-
fessional ethics rules provides an im-
portant option for lawyers in states
like Kentucky which don't specifi-
cally allow disclosures necessary to
prevent or rectify financial harm to
non-clients such as shareholders or
other investors. One expert on legal
ethics suggests that the lawyer may
elect, in the face of potential civil or
criminal liability for assisting a client's
fraud, to preemptively invoke the self-
defense exception in Rule 1.6(b) and
blow the whistle on the client's
wrongdoing before being implicated
personally.'
entucky is among a small
minority of states that do
ot permit disclosure to
third parties to prevent financial or
economic harm to others. Over forty
states currently permit or require
some form of disclosure to third par-
ties to prevent a client from commit-
ting a criminal fraud.6 In its present
form, then, Kentucky Rule 1.6 signifi-
cantly limits the options available to a
lawyer who learns of actual or poten-
tial corporate fraud in the course of
his or her representation of the orga-
nization.
The final report of the ABA Com-
mission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000),
presented to the ABA House of Del-
egates in August 2001, proposed to
amend Model Rule 1.6(b) to expand
the grounds for permissive disclosure
of client information. Under the
changes recommended by the Ethics
2000 Commission, disclosure would
be permitted to prevent the client
from committing a crime or fraud
reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial financial injury, if it involves
the lawyer's services, and to prevent,
mitigate or rectify the consequences
of a client's financial fraud or crime
in furtherance of which the lawyer's
services were used. These proposals
were consistent with corresponding
provisions of the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of the
6 Bench & Bar, May 2003
Law Governing Lawyers.7 The Eth-
ics 2000 recommendations were re-
jected by the House of Delegates.
Withdrawal from Representation
Model Rule 1.16 and the corre-
sponding Kentucky ethics rule require
the lawyer to withdraw from repre-
sentation of a client if the representa-
tion will result in a violation of law or
the rules of professional conduct.
The lawyer may withdraw if the cli-
ent persists in conduct involving the
lawyer's services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent, or if the client has used
the lawyer's services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud.
Comments to the rules of profes-
sional conduct8 indicate that, after
withdrawal, the lawyer is not prohib-
ited from giving notice to third parties
of the fact of withdrawal, and may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opin-
ion, document, affirmation or the like
to prevent its use in the client's con-
tinuing or intended future fraud (a
"noisy withdrawal"). ABA Formal
Opinion 92-366 confirms that the law-
yer may withdraw or disaffirm work
product even though this may have
the collateral effect of disclosing in-
ferentially confidential client informa-
tion. The lawyer may not, however,
effect a noisy withdrawal and disaf-
firm work product if the client's fraud
is completed and the lawyer doesn't
know or reasonably believe that the
client intends to continue the fraud by
use of the lawyer's services.
Statements to Third Parties
Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement
of material fact or law to a third per-
son, or failing to disclose a material
fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by a client, unless disclosure
is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
Comment [3] to Rule 4.1 ad-
dresses the relationship between Rule
1.2(d) and Rule 4.1. The comment
notes that, in cases where the client's
crime or fraud takes the form of mis-
representations, substantive law may
require a lawyer to disclose informa-
tion relating to the representation to
avoid being deemed to have assisted
the client's crime or fraud. "If the
lawyer can avoid assisting a client's
crime or fraud only by disclosing this
information, then under [Rule 4.1 (b)]
the lawyer is required to do so, unless
the disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6."
Knowledge
Standard and Duty of Inquiry
W at duty does an
organization 's attorney
have to investigate facts
suggesting that an officer or em-
ployee of the organization is engaged
in improper or illegal activity that
could result in significant harm to the
interests of the organization or third
parties? Under Rule 1.13, the
organization's lawyer must pursue up-
the-ladder reporting or other appropri-
ate responses if the lawyer "knows"
that an agent of the organization is
engaged in conduct that violates a
legal obligation owed to the organiza-
tion or constitutes a violation of law
which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization. Also, Rule 1.2(d)
prohibits a lawyer from assisting a
client in conduct that the lawyer
"knows" is criminal or fraudulent.
The permissive withdrawal provisions
of Rule 1. 16 apply if the lawyer "rea-
sonably believes" that a client is en-
gaged in criminal or fraudulent con-
duct. The model rules define "knowl-
edge" and "knows" as "actual knowl-
edge of the fact in question," although
knowledge may be inferred from cir-
cumstances. A "reasonable belief'
means that the lawyer "believes the
matter in question and that the cir-
cumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable." Reasonableness is
measured by the conduct of a rea-
sonably prudent and competent law-
yer. The ABA Task Force report
recommends that lawyers should be
held to the "reasonably should know"
standard, which under the Model
Rules means "that a lawyer of rea-
sonable prudence and competence
Services Provided
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* Medical Record review and analysis
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would ascertain the matter in ques-
tion."
It is not clear whether, in circum-
stances where a lawyer's profes-
sional responsibilities are predicated
upon actual knowledge of illegal or
improper corporate conduct, the law-
yer has an independent duty of in-
quiry to investigate facts or circum-
stances which appear to the lawyer
to be inconsistent with statements or
directions from his or her client. The
ABA Task Force report concludes
that "while lawyers should not be
subject to discipline for simple negli-
gence, they should not be permitted to
ignore the obvious." At least one
federal court has reached a similar
conclusion. In FDIC v. O'Melveny
& Myers,9 the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, in its capacity as
receiver of a failed financial institu-
tion, brought an action for profes-
sional negligence, negligent misrepre-
sentation and breach of fiduciary
duty against attorneys retained by the
institution to prepare offering docu-
ments for two real estate syndica-
tions. In its complaint, the FDIC al-
leged that the law firm never com-
municated with the institution's cur-
rent or previous auditors or attorneys
or its regulators regarding the
institution's financial condition. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that genuine issues of material fact
existed with regard to whether the
law firm fulfilled its professional du-
ties to the client institution and re-
versed the lower court's dismissal of
the claims against it. The court
stated that the law firm, as part of its
professional duties to its client, was
required to make a "reasonable, inde-
pendent investigation to detect and
correct false or misleading materials."
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ABA Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility
In March 2002, the American
ar Association established a
~ask force to examine corpo-
rate governance and responsibility
issues raised by the collapse of Enron
and similar situations. The Task
Force was asked to "examine the
framework of laws and regulations
and ethical principles governing the
roles of lawyers, executive officers,
directors, and other key participants.
The issues will be studied in the con-
text of the system of checks and bal-
ances designed to enhance the public
trust in corporate integrity and re-
sponsibility."
The Task Force issued a prelimi-
nary report on July 16, 2002.11 In its
report, the Task Force focused on
two areas: first, recommendations
for improving internal corporate gov-
ernance systems and second, the
proper role of corporate attorneys in
promoting corporate responsibility.
On the subject of lawyer responsibil-
ity and conduct, the Task Force pro-
posed a series of revisions to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to "help lawyers comply
with their duties to an organizational
client in circumstances in which cor-
porate officers engage in or counte-
nance criminal, fraudulent or decep-
tive conduct likely to cause harm to
the organization or its shareholders."
These proposals include:
" Amendments to Rule 1.13 to re-
quire a lawyer to pursue remedial
measures for misconduct, whether
the problem is related to the repre-
sentation or learned through the
representation, and to communi-
cate with higher corporate author-
ity where other efforts to prevent
or rectify the problem fail.
" Amendments to Rule 1.6 to extend
permissible third party disclosure
to conduct that has resulted or is
reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another, and
require disclosure under Rule 1.6
to prevent felonies or other serious
crimes, including violations of the
federal securities laws, where
such misconduct is known to the
lawyer. These amendments were
previously recommended by the
Ethics 2000 Commission and re-
jected by the ABA House of Del-
egates. The Task Force recom-
mends that the House of Del-
egates reconsider the Ethics 2000
proposals.
Amendments to Rules 1.2(d), 1.13
and 4.1 to lessen the knowledge
standard for lawyers to take action
under these rules from actual
knowledge to circumstances in
which the lawyer reasonably
should know of the crime or fraud.
The Task Force recommendations
are expected to be presented to the
ABA House of Delegates for its con-
sideration later this year.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
ection 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002'! directs
the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prescribe minimum
standards of conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the
Commission. The statute specifies
that the standards must include a rule
requiring an attorney to report evi-
dence of a material violation of secu-
rities laws or breach of fiduciary duty
or similar violation by the company or
any agent acting on its behalf to the
chief legal officer or the chief execu-
tive officer. If the corporate officers
don't respond in an appropriate man-
ner to the evidence, the attorney must
then report the evidence to the audit
committee, another committee of in-
dependent directors or the full board
of directors.
In January 2003, the Commission
adopted new rules implementing Sec-
tion 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The
Commission's adopting release
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clearly states that its new standards
are intended to preempt any conflict-
ing or inconsistent state ethics rules.
Thus, for the first time, Congress and
the SEC have acted to federalize the
field of legal ethics and professional
responsibility. The rules require attor-
neys to report evidence of material
securities law violations or breach of
fiduciary duty to the issuer's chief
legal officer or the chief executive
officer and the chief legal officer and,
if those officers don't respond in an
appropriate manner, "up-the-ladder"
to a higher corporate authority, includ-
ing the audit committee or the full
board of directors. If the company
has previously established a special
legal compliance committee of inde-
pendent directors to receive and in-
vestigate allegations of corporate mis-
conduct (a "qualified legal compliance
committee"), the attorney may in-
stead report the evidence to the com-
pliance committee. In this regard, the
basic up-the-ladder reporting model in
the new SEC rules is substantially
similar to Model Rule 1.13(b) and the
corresponding Kentucky ethics rule.
The SEC rules, which will become
effective August 5, 2003, apply to
attorneys "appearing and practicing"
before the Commission. The Com-
mission has chosen to adopt a very
expansive definition which extends
beyond securities lawyers and attor-
neys who specifically counsel clients
on disclosure matters under the fed-
eral securities laws to include, among
others, non-securities attorneys who
participate in the preparation or re-
view of any documents which the
attorney knows will be filed with or
submitted to the Commission.
For the most part, the rule covers
only those attorneys who represent
public companies before the SEC or
in connection with U.S. securities
laws. Attorneys advising non-public
companies in connection with exempt
securities offerings under the federal
securities laws, for example, would
be excluded from the rule. If the cli-
ent company is a non-public subsid-
iary of a public company, however,
the attorney would be subject to the
rule if the legal services are provided
to the subsidiary "on behalf of, or at
the behest, or for the benefit of the
[public company parent], regardless
of whether the attorney is employed
or retained by the [parent]." The rule
also limits the internal reporting re-
quirements to attorneys who provide
"legal services to an issuer with
whom the attorney has an attorney-
client relationship." Thus, attorneys
representing parties in privity of con-
tract with the issuer, such as banks
and underwriters, and licensed attor-
neys employed by an organization in
non-legal capacities, would be ex-
cluded.
A n attorney's obligation to
/L% report under these new
.L les is triggered when the
attorney becomes aware of "evidence
of a material violation" by the com-
pany or by any director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of the company, of
any federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty or a
similar material violation of any fed-
eral or state law. Evidence of a ma-
terial violation means "credible evi-
dence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circum-
stances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is rea-
sonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing or is about to
occur." In the adopting release for
the rule, the Commission states that,
for a violation to be "reasonably
likely," it "must be more than a mere
possibility, but it need not be 'more
likely than not'." The Commission
rejected suggestions from
commenters that the up-the-ladder
reporting obligations be triggered only
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when an attorney knows that a mate-
rial violation has occurred.
Following an attorney's initial re-
port to the chief legal officer or the
chief executive officer, the corporate
officer must investigate the evidence
and respond to the attorney. The ap-
propriateness of the officer's re-
sponse is to be measured both subjec-
tively and objectively. The attorney
will have no further reporting require-
ment if, as a result of the response to
his or her report of a material viola-
tion, the attorney reasonably believes
that (a) no material violation has oc-
curred, is ongoing or is about to occur,
(b) the issuer has adopted appropriate
remedial measures, or (c) the issuer
has retained an attorney to review the
reported evidence and either has
implemented the attorney's remedial
recommendations or has been ad-
vised that the attorney may assert
colorable defenses on its behalf. Un-
less the attorney receives an appro-
priate response he or she is then obli-
gated to report the matter to a higher
authority within the organization, in-
cluding the audit committee, another
committee of non-employee directors
or the full board of directors. If the
attorney chose to report the evidence
directly to a qualified legal compli-
ance committee, the attorney would
have no further obligations under the
rules.
Importantly, the rules permit, but
don't require, an attorney appearing
and practicing before the Commission
to reveal to the Commission, without
the company's consent, confidential
information related to the representa-
tion to the extent the attorney reason-
ably believes necessary to prevent
substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests of investors. The SEC provision,
then, directly conflicts with (and pre-
empts) Kentucky Supreme Court
Rule 3.130 (1.6), which allows disclo-
sure of confidential client information
only to prevent imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. This pre-
10 Bench & Bar, May 2003
emption should provide grounds for
an attorney to report evidence of im-
proper corporate conduct to the SEC
without risk of disciplinary action un-
der the Kentucky rules of profes-
sional conduct.
The Commission's initial rule pro-
posal included provisions which would
require attorneys appearing and prac-
ticing before the Commission to ef-
fect a "noisy withdrawal" from repre-
sentation if a reporting attorney, after
fully complying with the internal up-
the-ladder reporting requirements of
the rule, didn't receive an appropriate
response to his or her report of a ma-
terial violation. Specifically, an attor-
ney retained by the issuer who rea-
sonably believes that a material viola-
tion likely to result in substantial injury
to the financial interests of the issuer
or its investors is ongoing or about to
occur has fully reported evidence of
that material violation up-the-ladder
as required by
the rule and
not received
an appropriate
response
would then be
required to:
The traditional c
rule is that attor
fiduciary duties
clients, not to nc
parties.
" Withdraw
forthwith
from repre-
senting the issuer, indicating that
the withdrawal is based on profes-
sional considerations;
*Within one business day of with-
drawing, give written notice to the
Commission of the attorney's
withdrawal, indicating that the
withdrawal is based on profes-
sional considerations; and
" Promptly disaffirm to the Commis-
sion any opinion, document, affir-
mation, representation, character-
ization, or the like in a document
filed with or submitted to the Com-
mission, or incorporated into such
a document, that the attorney has
prepared or assisted in preparing
and that the attorney reasonably
believes is or may be materially
false or misleading.
If, instead of referring evidence of
the potential misconduct initially to the
company's chief legal officer or chief
executive officer and then to a higher
authority within the corporation, the
attorney elected in the first instance
to report the matter to a qualified le-
gal compliance committee, the attor-
ney would be relieved of the obliga-
tion to report his or her withdrawal
outside the corporation.
This "noisy withdrawal" proposal
attracted loud criticisms from
commenters who feared that the new
requirement would conflict with exist-
ing state ethics rules and interfere
with attorney-client relationships.
Commenters also questioned the
Commission's authority under Section
307 of Sarbanes-Oxley to require a
"noisy with-
drawal." In
ommon law response to
ieys owe their these con-
only to their cerns, theCommission)n-client third deferred ac-
tion on its ini-
tial noisy with-
drawal pro-
posal and pro-
posed an alternative requirement that
issuers, rather than attorneys, report
the fact of an attorney's withdrawal
to the Commission.
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Attorneys as Whistleblowers
and the Duty to Speak:
The Enron Case
The traditional common law rule is
that attorneys owe their fiduciary du-
ties only to their clients, not to non-
client third parties. Thus, in the ab-
sence of an affirmative duty to speak,
silence is generally not actionable and
attorneys would not be liable for fail-
ing to blow the whistle on their cli-
ents' ongoing or intended fraud.
Nevertheless, some courts have held
lawyers accountable when an attor-
ney voluntarily undertakes to commu-
nicate directly with non-clients in se-
curities transactions who rely on mis-
statements or omissions by the attor-
ney. In a 1998 opinion from the Sixth
Circuit, 4 the court held that "while an
attorney representing the seller in a
securities transaction may not always
be under an independent duty to vol-
unteer information about the financial
condition of his client, he assumes a
duty to provide complete and
nonmisleading information with re-
spect to subjects on which he under-
takes to speak." The court further
stated that an attorney who prepares
a false or misleading document may
be held liable as a primary violator of
the federal securities laws even
though direct negotiations with the
securities purchasers were conducted
by others.
The risk to an attorney or law firm
of not speaking out about a client's
misconduct is vividly illustrated by a
recent memorandum opinion and or-
der issued in Newby, et al. v. Enron
Corporation, et al. 5 A group of"sec-
ondary actors" including accountants,
lawyers, banks and investment bank-
ers for Enron were sued by investors
for securities fraud under federal and
state securities laws. The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that, under the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 6 they couldn't be
held liable as aiders and abettors of
Enron's primary securities law viola-
tions. In a controversial ruling, the
court refused to dismiss the claims
against one of Enron's principal out-
side law firms. After a lengthy re-
view of the professional ethics rules
and case law relevant to the duty of
an attorney to disclose nonmisleading
information about his or her client to
nonclients and third parties, the court
concluded that "professionals, includ-
ing lawyers . . ., when they take the
affirmative step of speaking out,
whether individually or as essentially
an author or co-author in a statement
or report, whether identified or not,
about their client's financial condition,
do have a duty to third parties not in
privity not to knowingly or with se-
vere recklessness issue materially
misleading statements on which they
intend or have reason to expect that
those third parties will rely." The
opinion contains a lengthy and de-
tailed account of the allegations in the
complaint regarding the law firm's
extensive participation in the prepara-
tion and review of Enron's filings with
the SEC, press releases and share-
holder reports and the structuring and
documentation of numerous financial
transactions on behalf of Enron. The
complaint alleges that these financing
transactions were not legitimate
arms-length commercial transactions
but rather manipulative arrangements
which Enron's attorneys knew were
designed to disguise the company's
true financial condition. The court
found that the law firm was "not
merely a drafter, but essentially a co-
author of the documents it created for
public consumption concealing its
own and other participants' actions."
For this reason and because it di-
rected the alleged fraudulent misrep-
resentations publicly to potential in-
vestors, credit rating agencies and
banks to maintain Enron's financial
condition, it had a duty to be accurate
and truthful. In contrast, the court
dismissed claims against a second
law firm on the grounds that its work
product on behalf of Enron never
reached the public and that traditional
rules of attorney-client privilege and
privity protected it against investors'
claims.
Conclusion
In the post-Enron reform era, leg-
islators, regulators and the courts will
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be looking closely at the role of attor-
neys in the corporate governance sys-
tem. Greater accountability will be
expected from lawyers whose ser-
vices and professional advice contrib-
ute materially to a client's financial
fraud or crime. At some point, tradi-
tional ethics principles of non-disclo-
sure, privity and attorney-client privi-
lege must be subordinated to the inter-
ests of investors and shareholders
who suffer substantial financial losses
as a result of corporate fraud. Efforts
like the ABA Task Force on Corpo-
rate Responsibility are a meaningful
and commendable step in the process
of rethinking professional ethics rules
to achieve an appropriate balancing of
these interests. 0
Endnotes appear on page 61
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